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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
       A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-
configuring network of mobile nodes. It lacks any 
fixed infrastructure like access points or base 
stations. It lacks centralized administration and is 
connected by wireless links/cables. Wireless ad 
hoc network can be build up where there is no 
support of wireless access or wired backbone is 
not feasible. All network services of ad hoc 
network are configured and created on the fly. 
Thus it is obvious that with lack of infrastructural 
support and susceptible wireless link attacks, 
security in ad hoc network becomes inherent 
weakness. Nodes within nomadic environment 
with access to common radio link can easily 
participate to set up ad hoc infrastructure. But the 
secure communication among nodes requires the 
secure communication link to communicate. 
Before establishing secure communication, link 
the node should be capable enough to identify  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
another node. As a result node needs to provide 
his/her identity as well as associated credentials to 
another node. However delivered identity and 
credentials need to be authenticated and protected 
so that authenticity and integrity of delivered 
identity and credentials cannot be questioned by 
receiver node. Every node wants to be sure that 
delivered identity and credentials to recipient 
nodes are not compromised. Therefore it is 
essential to provide security architecture to secure 
ad hoc networking. 
       
We found that many of the presently existing 
attacks have some common features and have been 
categorized into different attacks based on their 
minor differences. So hereby we are trying to 
categorize them into two broad categories:  DATA 
traffic attacks and CONTROL traffic attacks. This 
will help in future designing of security measures 
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which will be able in mitigating those broad 
categories in one go. 
2. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS 
 
As previously discussed, we have categorized 
the presently existing attacks into two broad 
categories: DATA traffic attacks and CONTROL 
traffic attacks. This classification is based on their 
common characteristics and attack goals. For 
example:  Black-Hole attack drops packets every 
time, while Gray-Hole attack also drops packets 
but its action is based on two conditions: time or 
sender node.  But from network point of view, 
both attacks drop packets and Gray-Hole attack 
can be considered as a Black-Hole attack when it 
starts dropping packets. So they can be categorized 
under a single category.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are few attacks that have implications on 
both DATA & CONTROL traffic, so they 
cannot be classified into these categories easily.  
 
So those attacks are left for future discussions. 
CLASSIFICATION OF MANET ATTACKS 
DATA traffic attack CONTROL traffic attack 
Black-Hole  
Cooperative Black-Hole  
Gray-Hole  
Worm-Hole  
HELLO Flood 
Bogus Registration 
Man in Middle Jellyfish  
Rushing  
Cache Poisoning 
Blackmail  
Cooperative Blackmail  
Sybil  
Figure 1: Classification of Mobile ADHOC Network (MANET) attacks 
 2.1 DATA Traffic Attack  
DATA traffic attack deals either in nodes 
dropping data packets passing through them or 
in delaying of forwarding of the data packets.  
Some types of attacks choose victim packets for 
dropping while some of them drop all of them 
irrespective of sender nodes. This may highly 
degrade the quality of service and increases end 
to end delay. This also causes significant loss of 
important data. For e.g., a 100Mbps wireless 
link can behave as 1Mbps connection. 
Moreover, unless there is a redundant path 
around the erratic node, some of the nodes can 
be unreachable from each other altogether.  
 
2.1.1 Black-Hole Attack [1][2][3][4] 
In this attack, a malicious node acts like a 
Black hole, dropping all data packets passing 
through it as like matter and energy disappears 
from our universe in a black hole. If the 
attacking node is a connecting node of two 
connecting components of that network, then it 
effectively separates the network in to two 
disconnected components. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Black-Hole Attack 
Here the Black-Hole node separates the 
network into two parts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Few strategies to mitigate the problem: 
 (i) Collecting multiple RREP messages 
(from more than two nodes) and thus hoping 
multiple redundant paths to the destination node 
and then buffering the packets until a safe route 
is found. 
 (ii) Maintaining a table in each node with 
previous sequence number in increasing order. 
Each node before forwarding packets increases 
the sequence number. The sender node 
broadcasts RREQ to its neighbors and once this 
RREQ reaches the destination, it replies with a 
RREP with last packet sequence number. If the 
intermediate node finds that RREP contains a 
wrong sequence number, it understands that 
somewhere something went wrong. 
2.1.2 Cooperative Black-Hole Attack [1][2][3] 
This attack is similar to Black-Hole 
attack, but more than one malicious node tries 
to disrupt the network simultaneously. It is 
one of the most severe DATA traffic attack 
and can totally disrupt the operation of an Ad 
Hoc network. Mostly the only solution 
becomes finding alternating route to the 
destination, if at all exists. 
Detection method is similar to ordinary Black-
Hole attack.  
In addition another solution is securing 
routing and node discovery in MANET by any 
suitable protocol such as SAODV, SNRP, 
SND, SRDP etc. Since each node is already 
trusted, black hole node should not be 
appearing in the network. 
 
 
2.1.3 Gray-Hole Attack [9][10] 
 
Gray-Hole attack has its own 
characteristic behavior. It too drops DATA 
packets, but node’s malicious activity is 
limited to certain conditions or trigger. Two 
most common type of behavior:  
 (i) Node dependent attack – drops 
DATA packets destined towards a certain 
victim node or coming from certain node (fig 
3), while for other nodes it behaves normally 
by routing DATA packets to the destination 
nodes correctly.  
(ii) Time dependent attack – drops DATA 
packets based on some predetermined/trigger 
time while behaving normally during the other 
instances. (fig. 4)  
Detecting this behaviorist attack is very 
difficult unless there exists a system wide 
detection algorithm, which takes care of all the 
nodes performance in the network. Sometimes 
nodes can interact with each other and can 
advise malicious nodes existence to other 
friendly nodes. Approach is similar to Black-
Hole attack where sequence number feedback 
might detect some Gray-Hole attack. If 
multiple paths exist between sender and 
destination then buffering packets with proper 
acknowledgement (for e.g. 2ACK [14]) might 
detect active Gray-Hole attack in progress. But 
dormant or triggered attack is difficult to 
detect with this approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Gray-Hole – Node dependent attack 
 
 
Figure 4: Gray-Hole – Time dependent attack 
 
 
 
2.1.4 Jellyfish Attack [12][13][28] 
Jellyfish attack is somewhat different from 
Black-Hole & Gray-Hole attack. Instead of 
blindly dropping the data packets, it delays them 
before finally delivering them. It may even 
scramble the order of packets in which they are 
received and sends it in random order. This 
disrupts the normal flow control mechanism 
used by nodes for reliable transmission. Jellyfish 
attack can result in significant end to end delay 
and thereby degrading QoS. Few of the methods 
used by attacker in this attack:  
(i) One of the methods is scrambling packet 
order before finally delivering them instead of 
received FIFO order. ACK based flow control 
mechanism will generate duplicate ACK packets 
which will unnecessarily consume precious 
network bandwidth and battery life.  
(ii) ) Another method can be, performing 
selective Black-Hole attack by dropping all 
packets at every RTO. This will cause timeout in 
sender node at every RTO for that duration. If 
nodes use traffic shaping, default flow control 
mechanism might be triggered to the sender 
node as it is same as destination overwhelm 
(iii) The attacking node can store all the 
received packets in its buffer but sends them 
after some random delay maintaining the 
received packet order. Here also the flow control 
mechanism gets confused. Sometimes the source 
node might take a longer route instead of the 
most obvious shortest route.  
Few of the solutions to Jellyfish type attack 
includes: 
(i) 2ACK [14] : The basic idea of the 2ACK 
scheme is that, when a node forwards a data 
packet successfully over the next hop, the 
destination node of the next-hop link will send 
back a special two-hop acknowledgment called 
2ACK to indicate that the data packet has been 
received successfully. Such a 2ACK 
transmission takes place for only a fraction of 
data packets, but not for all. 
(ii)  Credit based systems [22]: This approach 
provides incentives for successful transmission 
of some kind of token or credit which the node 
might use when it starts sending its own packet. 
(iii) Reputation based scheme [22]: Here 
individual nodes collectively detect misbehaving 
nodes (such as CONFIDANT). 
 
2.2 CONTROL Traffic Attack  
Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) is 
inherently vulnerable to attack due to its 
fundamental characteristics, such as open 
medium, distributed nodes, autonomy of nodes 
participation in network (nodes can join and 
leave the network on its will), lack of centralized 
authority which can enforce security on the 
network, distributed co-ordination and 
cooperation. The existing routing protocols can 
not be used in MANET due to these reasons.  
Many of the routing protocols devised for 
use in MANET have their individual 
characteristic and rules. Two of the most widely 
used routing protocols is Ad-Hoc On Demand 
Distance Vector routing protocol (AODV), 
which relies on individual node’s cooperation in 
establishing a valid routing table and Dynamic 
MANET On-Demand (DYMO) , which is a fast 
light weight routing protocol devised for multi 
hop networks. But each of them is based on trust 
on nodes participating in network. The first step 
in any successful attack requires the node to be 
part of that network. As there is no constraint in 
joining the network, malicious node can join and 
disrupts the network by hijacking the routing 
tables or bypassing valid routes. It can also 
eavesdrop on the network if the node can 
establish itself as the shortest route to any 
destination by exploiting the unsecure routing 
protocols. Therefore it is of utmost importance 
that the routing protocol should be as much 
secure as it can be.  
Though there can be other kinds of attack, 
such as jamming attacks, which is not 
CONTROL attack. They can be tackled as a part 
of physical layer security protocols. Henceforth 
those attacks will not be discussed as  are out of 
scope of this paper. 
 
2.2.1 Worm Hole Attack [5][6][7] 
Worm hole, in cosmological term, connects 
two distant points in space via a shortcut route. 
In the same way in MANET also one or more 
attacking node can disrupt routing by short-
circuiting the network, thereby disrupting usual 
flow of packets. If this link becomes the lowest 
cost path to the destination then these malicious 
nodes will always be chosen while sending 
packets to that destination. The attacking node 
then can either monitor the traffic or can even 
disrupt the flow (via one of the DATA traffic 
attack). Wormhole attack can be done with 
single node also but generally two or more 
malicious node connects via a wormhole-link. In 
figure 5, Node X and Y performing wormhole 
attack. 
 
 
Figure 5: Worm-Hole attack 
There have been few proposals recently to 
protect networks from worm-hole attack: 
(i) Geographical leashes & 
temporal leashes: A leash is added to each 
packet in order to restrict the distance the 
packets are allowed to travel. A leash is 
associated with each hop. Thus, each 
transmission of a packet requires a new leash. A 
geographical leash is intended to limit the 
distance between the transmitter and the receiver 
of a packet. A temporal leash provides an upper 
bound on the lifetime of a packet. 
(ii) Using directional antenna: 
Using directional antenna restricts the direction 
of signal propagation through air. This is one of 
the crude ways of limiting packet dispersion. 
2.2.2 HELLO Flood Attack 
The attacker node floods the network with a 
high quality route with a powerful transmitter. 
So, every node can forward their packets 
towards this node hoping it to be a better route 
to destination.  Some can forward packets for 
those destinations which are out of the reach of 
the attacker node. A single high power 
transmitter can convince that all the nodes are 
his neighbor. The attacker node need not 
generate a legitimate traffic; it can just perform a 
selective replay attack as its power overwhelms 
other transceivers.   
 
2.2.3 Bogus Registration Attack 
A Bogus registration attack is an active 
attack in which an attacker disguises itself as 
another node either by sending stolen beacon or 
generating such false beacons to register himself 
with a node as a neighbor. Once registered, it 
can snoop transmitted packets or may disrupt the 
network altogether. But this type of attack is 
difficult to achieve as the attacker needs to 
intimately know the masquerading nodes 
identity and network topology. Encrypting 
packets before sending and secure authentication 
in route discovery (SRDP, SND, SNRP, ARAN, 
etc) will limit the severity of attack to some 
extent as attacker node has no previous 
knowledge of encryption method. 
 
2.2.4 Man in Middle Attack [30] 
In Man in Middle attack, the attacker node 
creeps into a valid route and tries to sniff packets 
flowing through it. To perform man in middle 
attack, the attacker first needs to be part of that 
route. It can do that by either temporarily 
disrupting the route by deregistering a node by 
sending malicious disassociation beacon 
captured previously or registering itself in next 
route timeout event. One way of protecting 
packets flowing through MANET from prying 
eyes is encrypting each packet. Though key 
distribution becomes a security issue. 
 2.2.5 Rushing Attack 
In AODV or related protocol, each node 
before transmitting its data, first establishes a 
valid route to destination. Sender node 
broadcasts a RREQ (route request) message in 
neighborhood and valid routes replies with 
RREP (route reply) with proper route 
information. Some of the protocols use duplicate 
suppression mechanism to limit the route request 
and reply chatter in the network. Rushing attack 
exploits this duplicate suppression mechanism. 
Rushing attacker quickly forwards with a 
malicious RREP on behalf of some other node 
skipping any proper processing. Due to duplicate 
suppression, actual valid RREP message from 
valid node will be discarded and consequently 
the attacking node becomes part of the route. In 
rushing attack, attacker node does send packets 
to proper node after its own filtering is done, so 
from outside the network behaves normally as if 
nothing happened. But it might increase the 
delay in packet delivering to destination node. 
 
 
Figure 6: Rushing Attack 
Few of the protocols that might help in resolving 
Rushing attack: 
(i) SEDYMO [24]: Secured Dynamic 
MANET On-Demand is similar to DYMO but it 
dictates intermediate node must add routing 
information while broadcasting the routing 
messages and no intermediate node should 
delete any routing information from previous 
sender while broadcasting. It also incorporates 
hash chains and digital signature to protect the 
identity. 
(ii)  SRDP [23]: Secure Route Discovery 
Protocol is security enhanced Dynamic Source 
routing (DSR) protocol.  
(iii)  SND [26]: Secure Neighbor Detection is 
another method of verifying each neighbor’s 
identity within a maximum transmission range.  
 
 
 
2.2.6 Cache Poisoning Attack 
Generally in AODV, each node keeps few of 
its most recent transmission routes until timeout 
occurs for each entry. So each route lingers for 
some time in node’s memory. If some malicious 
node performs a routing attack then they will 
stay in node’s route table until timeout occurs or 
a better route is found. An attacker node can 
advertise a zero metric to all of its destinations. 
Such route will not be overwritten unless 
timeout occurs. It can even advertise itself as a 
route to a distant node which is out of its reach. 
Once it becomes a part of the route, the attacker 
node can perform its malicious activity.  Effect 
of Cache poisoning can be limited by either 
adding boundary leashes or by token 
authentication. Also each node can maintain its 
friend-foe list based on historical statistics of 
neighboring nodes performance.  
Few of the mitigation methods proposed: 
(i) SAODV [29]: Secure AODV is an 
extension to AODV protocol that adds each 
node to exchange signed routing messages. Each 
node has its own public key which it uses to sign 
routing messages. Also SAODV uses hop count 
as a metric for shortest-route as AODV and uses 
hash chains to secure hop count information in 
route messages. 
(ii) ARAN [16][18][28] : Authenticated Routing 
protocol for Ad-hoc Networks uses similar 
techniques as SAODV. ARAN uses certificates 
issued by a third party certification authority.  
(iii) SNRP [16]: Secure Neighbor Routing 
protocol uses security enhanced Neighbor 
Lookup Protocol (NLP) to secure MANET 
routing. Newly added node uses public key to 
participate in MANET. 
 
2.2.7 Blackmailing and Co-operative Blackmailing 
Attack 
In a blackmailing attack or more effectively 
co-operative blackmailing attack, attacker nodes 
accuse an innocent node as harmful node. This 
attack can effectively be done on those 
distributed protocols that establish a good and 
bad node list based on review of participating 
nodes in MANET.  Few of the protocols tries to 
make them more secure by using majority voting 
principle, but still if sufficient no. of attacker 
nodes become part of the MANET it can bypass 
that security also.  
Another generic method of this attack will 
be, sending invalid RREP messages with 
advertising an unnecessarily high cost to certain 
nodes.  
Known mitigation techniques: 
(i) Dynamic Trust based, Distributed IDs 
[22]: As MANET routing is a co-operative 
process, while building a route each node must 
evaluate its neighbor nodes. This method builds 
a distributed trust relationships and maintain 
dynamic trust information. As the trust is part of 
a long chain, single malicious node cannot 
victimize an innocent node easily. 
(ii) Friend List based [22]:  Another solution 
will be building a friend list of trusted nodes. 
Nodes identity must be determined by the user 
who created the MANET. So it becomes a 
closed system of trusted nodes. 
 
2.2.8 Sybil Attack 
Sybil attack manifests itself by faking 
multiple identities by pretending to be consisting 
of multiple nodes in the network. So one single 
node can assume the role of multiple nodes and 
can monitor or hamper multiple nodes at a time. 
If Sybil attack is performed over a blackmailing 
attack, then level of disruption can be quite high.  
Success in Sybil attack depends on how the 
identities are generated in the system.   
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sybil Attack 
In figure 7, node M1 assumes identities of 
M2, M3, M4, and M5. So, to node B, M1 is 
equivalent to those nodes. 
One way of mitigating this attack is 
maintaining a chain of trust, so single identity is 
generated by a hierarchical structure which may 
be hard to fake.  
 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
We have tried to categorize the different 
types of ad hoc security attacks solely based on 
their characteristics to considerably reduce the 
mitigation period. By bringing the attacks under 
these two broad categories the complicacy of 
naming also reduces. We have also kept a close 
look on the existing algorithms needed to 
mitigate the attacks and have tried to bind the 
attacks into categories according to that.  
Some attacks have characteristics which 
makes them unsuitable to be categorized into 
these categories, so they have been kept away 
from this topic of discussion for the time being. 
Further study is in progress to find out more 
common characteristics of the attacks to more 
strongly bind them into these categories and to 
ably design more powerful algorithm in 
mitigating DATA and CONTROL traffic 
attacks. 
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